Monday, October 28, 2013


In criminal cases, prosecuted under the laws of the United States, the accused has the constitutional right "to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation." Amend. VI. In U.S. v. Mills, 7 Pet., 142, this was construed to mean that the indictment must set forth the offense "with clearness and all necessary certainty, to apprise the accused of the crime with which he stands charged;" and in U.S. v. Cook, 17 Wall., 174 [84 U.S., XXI., 539], that "Every ingredient of which the offense is composed must be accurately and clearly alleged." It is an elementary principle of criminal pleading, that where the definition of an offense, whether it be at common law or by statute, "includes generic terms, it is not sufficient that the indictment shall charge the offense in the same generic terms as in the definition; but it must state the species; it must descend to particulars." 1 Arch. Cr. Pr. and Pl., 291. The object of the indictment is, first, to furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense, and avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and, second, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had. For this, facts are to be stated, not conclusions of law alone. A crime is made up of acts and intent; and these must be set forth in the indictment, with reasonable particularity of time, place and circumstances.
In United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 557, the Supreme court espoused "the universal rule that every ingredient of the offense must be clearly and accurately described so as to bring the defendant within the true intent and meaning of the provision defining the offense. Such a vague and indefinite description of a material ingredient of the defense [sic] is not a compliance with the rules of pleading in framing an indictment. On the contrary, such an indictment is insufficient, and must be held bad on demurrer or in arrest of judgment. [United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 557) Comment: Since the indictment contained a conclusion of law that DEFENDANT was a "person required," he was therefore not informed sufficiently in advance of trial to determine the nature of his plea and to prepare his defense.] LOL
No where in the the original legislation, the charging papers, indictment or complaint, is reasonable notice or any indication given that so and so is a person subject to vicarious liability within the true intent and meaning of the provision defining the offense.
Opposing counsel's charging papers fail to give notice that he is in fact a PERSON, or creature of statute, subject to vicarious liability within the intent of the law.

A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge against him and an opportunity to be heard in his defense are basic, and such rights include, as a minimum, a right to examine witnesses against him, to offer testimony, and to be represented by counsel.

My client would like to settle this matter today, and abate, arrest judgement, demurrer, plea in Bar, Plea in abatement out of bar, ect ect this matter until apposing counsel, given notice error and grace to amend insufficient process, can respond or answer as required and amend his incomplete and insufficient charging papers and claim to be an actionable one citing appropriate grounds in support, a bill of particular – lest he fail to respond, answer, or prosecute in accordance the requirements of due process so that we may reasonably respond, prepare a defense, or knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily accept criminal responsibility, mala insa.

does everyone in the mala prohibita court room follow ?

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