Monday, September 30, 2013

Practicing Law (Updated)

New Version

1. THAT "The practice of Law is an occupation of common right, the same being a secured liberty right." (Sims v. Aherns, 271 S.W. 720 (1925)); "Our rights cannot, by acts of Congress, be bartered away, given away or taken away." (Butcher's Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 US 746 (1883)); "The State cannot diminish the rights of the people." (Hurtado v California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884)); See 9th Ammendment
2. THAT No state may convert a secured liberty right into a privilege, issue a license and fee for it. "A state may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by Federal constitution." (Murdock vs Pennsylvania 319 US 105 at 113 (1943)). Requiring licensing or registration of any constitutional right is itself unconstitutional. (Follett vs. Town of McCormick, S.C., 321 U.S. 573 (1944)); “The [inferior] court is to protect against any encroachment of Constitutionally secured liberties.” (Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616 (1886)); being the only legitamate purpose of government instituted by men.
3. THAT The practice of Law can not be licensed by any state/State. (Schware v. Board of Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238, 239 (1957)); "Federal Law and Supreme Court Cases apply to State Court Cases." (Griffin v. Mathews, 310 Supp. 341, 423 F. 2d 272; Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528; Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990)). "The police power of the state must be exercised in subordination to the provisions of the U.S. Constitution." (Bacahanan vs. Wanley, 245 US 60 (); Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. vs. State Highway Commission, 294 US 613 ()). "Every State law must conform in the first place to the Constitution of the United States, and then to the subordinate constitutions of the particular state; and if it infringes upon the provisios of either, it is so far void." ( Houston v. Moore, 18 US 1, 5 L.Ed 19 (1840))
4. THAT Should any state convert a secured liberty right into a privilege, charge a fee and issue a license for it, one may ignore the license and fee and engage in the exercise of the right with impunity. (Shuttlesworth vs City of Birmingham 373 U.S. 262 (1962)) " No one is bound to obey an unconstitutional law... Indeed insofar as a statute runs counter to the fundamental law of the land, it is superseded thereby... An unconstitutional law cannot operate to supersede any existing law... A void act cannot be legally consistent with a valid one." (Bonnett v. Vallier, 116 N.W. 885, 136 Wis. 193 (1908); Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425 (1886)); Should any state convert any right to work into a privilege, issue a license and charge a fee, the same is unconstitutional, null and void, bears no obligation to obey, and is without effect in law. (Marburry vs Madison 5 US 137 (1803));
5. "The Framers of the Bill of Rights did not purport to "create" rights. Rather, they designed the Bill of Rights to prohibit our Government from infringing rights and liberties presumed to be preexisting." ~ Justice William J. Brennan; "The people of the state, as the successors of its former sovereign, are entitled to all the rights [common law and commercial remedies] which formerly belonged to the king by his own prerogative." (Lansing v. Smith, 4 Wendell 9, NY (1829)); "Where the word of a king is, there is power: and who may say unto him, What doest thou?" (Ecclesiastes 8:4); "The power to "legislate generally upon life, liberty, and property, as opposed to the "power to provide modes of redress" against offensive state action, is "repugnant" to the Constitution." ( United States v Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 218 Id., at 15 (1876); United States v, Harpris, 106 U.S. 629,639 (1883); James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 139 (1903)). THAT "Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate or abolish them." (Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436 at 491, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed. 2d 694 (1966))
6. THAT "[O]ne who relies on prior decisions of the Supreme Court [Shepardized and not overturned or superceeded by inferior subsequent legislation] has a perfect defense for 'willfulness.'" (U.S. v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346 (1973), as “The claim and exercise of a Constitutional right cannot be converted into a crime.”(Miller v. U.S., 230 F.2d. 486, 489 (1956); "There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one because of his exercise of Constitutional Rights." (Sherar v. Cullen, 481 F. 2d 946 (1973)); "The assertion of federal rights, when plainly and reasonably made, are not to be defeated under the name of local practice." (Davis v. Wechler, 263 U.S. 22, 24; Stromberb v. California, 283U.S. 359; NAACP v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 449; Davis v. Wechler, 263 U.S. 22, 24; Elmore v. Mcammon 640 (1966); Stromberb v. California, 283 U.S. 359; NAACP v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 449)). “No public policy of a state can be allowed to override the positive guarantees of the U.S. Constitution.” (16 Am.Jur. (2nd), Const. Law, Sect. 70) "... the free inhabitants of each of these states, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from Justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several states" Article IV of the Articles of Confederation, extending the privileges of citizenship to mere inhabitants.
Foot Note : Hamilton, along with many other founders, such as George Washington, called the U.S. Constitution a “Confederacy,” because they knew that the nature and character of the compact of the U.S. Constitution DID NOT change from the Articles of Confederation. At that time, the term “Confederacy” was synonymous with “The United States of America.” “The Stile of this Confederacy shall be ‘The United States of America’.” - The Articles of Confederation, Art. I.; “[T]hat the laws of the Confederacy as to the enumerated and legitimate objects of its jurisdiction, will become the supreme law of the land, to the observance of which, all officers… in each State, will be bound by the sanctity of an oath. Thus the legislatures, courts, and magistrates, of the respective members [States], will be incorporated into the operation of the national government as far as its just and constitutional authority extends.” - Federalist, no. 27, 174--75, Alexander Hamilton, 25 Dec. 1787
7. THAT “A state may impose an excise upon the franchise of corporations engaging in a business which every private Citizen has a right to engage in freely. The privilege taxed is the right to engage in such business with the special advantages which are incident to corporate existence." California Bank v. San Francisco, 142 Cal. 276, 75 Pac. 832, 100 A.S.R. 130, 64 L.R.A. 918. "A State may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a Right granted by the federal Constitution... Thus, it may not extract a license tax for the privilege of carrying on commerce." (Murdock v Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 113 (1942); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 491 (1966)). “The sovereignty of a state extends to everything which exists by its own authority", or "is introduced by its permission.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819)); "The power to "legislate generally upon life, liberty, and property, as opposed to the "power to provide modes of redress" against offensive state action, is "repugnant" to the Constitution." ( United States v Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 218 Id., at 15 (1876); United States v, Harpris, 106 U.S. 629,639 (1883); James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 139 (1903)); Government possesses 'sovereign immunity,' ['qaulified immunity,' and 'judicial immunity,'] but in relation only to those it creates, and certainly not when acting in an administrative capacity upon the rights of those it has not created. (Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 371 (1943)). "The people, or sovereign are not bound by general words in statutes, restrictive of prerogative right, title or interest, unless expressly named. Acts of limitation do not bind the King or the people. The people have been ceded all the rights of the King, the former sovereign ... It is a maxim of the common law, that when an act is made for the common good and to prevent injury, the King shall be bound, though not named, but when a statute is general and prerogative right would be divested or taken from the King [or the people] he shall not be bound." (The People v. Herkimer, 4 Cowen (NY) 345, 348 (1825); nothing without contract


no lawful interference with contract or restriction by a third party may be placed on the free will election of a representative

THAT “The rights of the individual are not derived from governmental agencies, either municipal, state or federal, or even from the Constitution. They exist inherently in every man, by endowment of the Creator, and are merely reaffirmed in the Constitution, and restricted only to the extent that they have been voluntarily surrendered by the citizenship to the agencies of government. The people’s rights are not derived from the government, but the government’s authority comes from the people. The Constitution but states again these rights already existing, and when legislative encroachment by the nation, state, or municipality invade these original and permanent rights, it is the duty of the courts to so declare, and to afford the necessary relief. The fewer restrictions that surround the individual liberties of the citizen, except those for the preservation of the public health, safety, and morals, the more contented the people and the more successful the democracy.” (City of Dallas v. Mitchell, 245 S.W. 944, 945-46, Tex.Civ.App. – Dalls (1922)

THAT “Each of us has a natural right — from God– to defend his person, his liberty, and his property. These are the three basic requirements of life, and the preservation of any one of them is completely dependent upon the preservation of the other two. For what are our faculties but the extension of our individually? And what is property but an extension of our faculties? If every person has the right to defend–even by force–his person, his liberty, and his property, then it follows that a group of men have the right to organize and support a common force to protect these rights constantly. Thus the principle of collective right– its reason for existing, its lawfulness– is based on individual right. And the common force that protects this collective right cannot logically have any other purpose or any other mission than that for which it acts as a substitute. This, since an individual cannot lawfully use force against the person, liberty, or property of another individual, then the common force–for the same reason–cannot lawfully be used to destroy the person, liberty, or property of individuals or groups. Force has been given to us to defend our own individual rights. Who will dare to say that force has been given to us to destroy the equal rights of our brothers? Such a perversion of force would be, in both cases, contrary to our premise. Since no individual acting, separately can lawfully use force to destroy the rights of others, does it not logically follow that the same principle also applies to the common force that is nothing more than the organized combination of the individual forces? If this is true, then nothing can be more evident than this: The law is the organization of the natural right of lawful defense. It is the collective organization of the individual right to lawful defense... It is the substitution of a common force for the individual forces. And this common force is to do only what the individual forces have a natural and lawful right to do: to protect persons, liberties, and properties; to maintain the right of each, and to cause justice to reign over us all.” - Federac Bastiat June 1850
10. THAT 'Litigants may be assisted by unlicensed layman during judicial proceedings' (Brotherhood of Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar 377 U.S. 1; Gideon v. Wainwright 372 U.S. 335; Argersinger v. Hamlin, Sheriff 407 U.S. 425), and 'Members of groups who are competent nonlawyers may assist other members of the group [family, association, or class] achieve the goals of the group in court without being charged with "Unauthorized practice of law." ' (NAACP v. Button 371 U.S. 415; United Mineworkers of America v. Gibbs 383 U.S. 715; and Johnson v. Avery 89 S. Ct. 747 (1969). "When many join in one act, the law says it is the act of him who could best do it; and things should be done by him who has the best skill." (Noy's Max. h.t.); “ A 'Next Friend' is a person who represents someone who is unable to tend to his or her own interest.” (FRCP, Rule 17, 28 USCA); Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 11.12. provides for WHO MAY PRESENT PETITION stating : "Either the party for whose relief the writ is intended, or any person for him, may present a petition to the proper authority for the purpose of obtaining relief."
11. THAT "[O]ne brother may maintain any suite for another." ( 2 Inst. 564 ; Plowd. 304 a ; 1 Haw. P.C. 252) ; whereas " Natural affection or brotherly love are good [ a valid cause and standing in law ] to raise an[ y ] use[ age ] . "(bb) - (The Principle Grounds And Maxims Of Law, William Noy Attorney General to King Charles I ( 1824 ) )

12. "There can be no limitation on the power of the people of the United States. By their authority the State Constitutions were made, and by their authority the Constitution of the United States was established" (Hauenstein vs Lynham 100 US 483 (1879)) "It is not the function of our Government to keep the citizen from falling into error; it is the function of the citizen to keep the government from falling into error." (Perry v. United States, 204 U.S. 330, 358; American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 442 (1950); “In the early days of our Republic, ‘prosecutor’ was simply anyone who voluntarily went before the grand Jury with a complaint.” (United States v. Sandford, Fed. Case No.16, 221, C.Ct.D.C. (1806); “Republics are created by the virtue, public spirit, and intelligence of the citizens. They fall when the wise are banished from the public councils, because they dare to be honest, and the profligate are rewarded, because they flatter the people, in order to betray them.” Justice Joseph Story, U.S. Supreme Ct. 1811-1845. "[E]ven so we speak; not as pleasing men, but God... For neither at any time used we flattering words." 1 Thessalonians 2:4-5.
THAT Any private citizen acting as "Private Attorney General" may bring suit against any public official, and allows average citizens, alone or in groups and classes, to sue those organizations and government agents that commit crimes against them and in violation of their natural and civil rights under color of law and legitamate operation of government, in and effecting commerce for damages. The object of RICO is thus not merely to compensate victims "but to turn them into prosecutors," acting as "private attorneys generals, dedicated to eliminating racketeering activity," and has the "further purpose [of] encouraging potential private plaintiffs diligently to investigate." (Malley-Duff, 483 U.S., at 151; 3 Id., at 187) There are presently over 60 federal statutes that encourage private enforcement by allowing prevailing private plaintiffs to collect attorney's fees. "The provision for treble damages is accordingly justified by the expected benefit of suppressing racketeering activity, an object pursued the sooner the better." (Rotella v. Wood et al., 528 U.S. 549 (2000); Private Attorney Generals, who by their own 'self determination' merely aspired to be a 'private party public advocate' have been accordingly awarded judgments declaring entire cities, townships, counties, police and sherrif departments corrupt criminal enterprises and awarded damages, fees and expences, as the “Private Attorney General” concept holds that a successful private party plaintiff is entitled to recovery of his legal expenses, including attorney fees - "if he can advance a policy inherent in public interest legislation on behalf of a significant class of persons." ( Dasher v. Housing Authority of City of Atlanta, Ga., D.C.Ga., 64 F.R.D. 720, 722; See also Equal Access to Justice Act, and Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976)) ++ See Cook County Federal Ruling, ect. ++


10. THAT (a) Political Liberty is an effectual share in the making and administration of the laws. (Lieb. Civil Lib). (b) Personal Liberty consists in the power of locomotion, of changing situation, of removing one's person to whatever place one's inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint unless by due course of law. (1 Bl. Comm. 134); (c) "Natural Liberty is the right which nature gives to all mankind of disposing of their persons and property after the manner they judge most consistent with their happiness, on condition of their acting within the limits of the law of nature, and so as not to interfere with an equal exercise of the same rights by other men." (Burlamaqui, c. 3, § 15; 1 131. Comm. 125); "Every citizen and freeman is endowed with certain rights and privileges to enjoy which no written law or statute is required. These are the fundamental or natural rights, recognized among all free people." (U.S. v. Morris. 125 F 322, 325 (1903)). "The right to the enjoyment of life and liberty and the right to acquire and possess property are fundamental rights of the citizens of the several states and are not dependent upon the Constitution of the United States or the federal government for their existence." (Hodges v. U.S., 203 US 1 (1942)); "Under our system of government upon the individuality and intelligence of the citizen, the state does not claim to control him/her, except as his/her conduct to others [injured party] leaving him/her the sole judge as to all that affects himself/herself." (Mugler v. Kansas 123 U.S. 623, 659-60 (1887)); Justice Felix Frankfurter (November 15, 1882 – February 22, 1965) appointed to the United States Supreme Court in 1939 stated "... when the people want to do something I can't find anything in the Constitution expressly forbidding them to do, I say, whether I like it or not, 'Goddammit, let 'em do it.'"

All principles and enumerated rights contained within the Declaration of Independence of July 4, 1776 and the Bill of Rights of circa 1791 are brought forward, reserved, retained, invoked and made a part hereof by inclusion and specific reference thereto.

THAT "All acts of legislature apparently contrary to natural right and justice are, in our laws and must be in the nature of things, considered as void. The laws of nature are the laws of God; whose authority can be superseded by no power on earth. A legislature must not obstruct our obedience to him from whose punishments they cannot protect us. All human constitutions which contradict his laws, we are in conscience bound to disobey. Such have been the adjudications of our courts of justice." (Robin v. Hardaway, 1 Jefferson 109, 114 (1772); "…every man is independent of all laws, except those prescribed by nature. He is not bound by any institutions [or licensing boards] formed by his fellowman without his consent." (Cruden v. Neale, 2 N.C. 338, 2 S.E. (1796); "This law of nature, being co-eval with mankind and dictated by God himself, is of course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times: no human laws are of any validity if contrary to this; ... upon these two foundations, the law of nature and the law of revelation, depend all human laws; that is to say, no human laws should be suffered to contradict these... Any law contrary to the Law of God, is no law at all." (William Blackstone, The Commentaries of the Law of England, Volume I, "Of the Rights of Persons," at 2 and 41 (1765); "Inasmuch as every government is an artificial person, an abstraction, and a creature of the mind only, a government can interface only with other artificial persons. The imaginary, having neither actuality nor substance, is foreclosed from creating and attaining parity with the tangible. The legal manifestation of this is that no government, as well as any law, agency, aspect, court, etc. can concern itself with anything other than corporate, artificial persons and the contracts between them." (S.C.R. 1795, Penhallow v. Doane’s Administrators 3 U.S. 54; 1 L.Ed. 57; 3 Dall. 54); "This fundamental principle flows from the very nature of our free Republican governments, that no man should be compelled to do what the laws do not require; nor to refrain from acts which the laws permit ..."( Calder v. Bull, 3 Dallas 386 (1798)); "God alone is the lawgiver of eternity" - Judge Henry Clay, Crimes of the Civil War, 1868, pages 428-432. "The law is from everlasting." Bouviers Law Dictionary, 1914, 'Maxim', page 2143. (Psalm 90:2; 93:2; 145:13). and that he be left alone citation

“The institutions of our society are founded on the belief that there is an authority higher than the authority of the State; that there is a moral law which the State is powerless to alter; that the individual possesses rights, conferred by the Creator, which government must respect. The Declaration of Independence stated the now familiar theme: ‘We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness.’ And the body of the Constitution as well as the Bill of Rights enshrined those principles.” (McGowan v. Maryland, 366 US 420, 563, Supreme Court (1961); "The right to the enjoyment of life and liberty and the right to acquire and possess property are fundamental rights of the citizens of the several states and are not dependent upon the Constitution of the United States or the federal government for their existence." (Hodges v. U.S., 203 US 1 (1942)); "The Framers of the Bill of Rights did not purport to "create" rights. Rather, they designed the Bill of Rights to prohibit our Government from infring­ing rights and liberties presumed to be preexisting." ~Justice William J. Brennan, 1982
THAT "The "individual" may stand upon "his Constitutional Rights" as a Citizen. He is entitled to carry on his "private" business in his own way... His power to contract is unlimited... He owes no duty to the State or to his neighbors to divulge his business, or to open his doors to an investigation, so far as it may tend to incriminate him. He owes no duty to the State, since he receives nothing there from, beyond the protection of his life and property. "His rights" are such as "existed" by the Law of the Land (Common Law) "long antecedent" to the organization of the State", and can only be taken from him by "due process of law", and "in accordance with the Constitution... He owes nothing" to the public so long as he does not trespass upon their rights." (Hale v. Henkel 201 U.S. 43 at 89 (1906)) - published by the Federal and State Appellate Court systems in over 1,600 cases.

THAT "Each citizen acts as a 'Private Attorney General' who 'takes on the mantel of sovereign' " (Title 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, Wood v. Breier, 54 F.R.D. 7, 10-11 E.D. Wis. (1972); Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. 339 E.D. Pa. (1973); and "Who is the sovereign, de jure or de facto, of a territory, is not a judicial, but a political, question, the determination of which by the legislative and executive departments of any government conclusively binds the judges [who are barred from making political determinations], as well as all other officers, citizens, and subjects of that government. This principle has always been upheld by this court, and has been affirmed under a great variety of circumstances." Gelston v. Hoyt, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246, 324; U. S. v. Palmer, Id. 610; The Divina Pastora 17 U.S.(4 Wheat.) 52; Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 307, 309; Keene v. McDonough, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 308; Garcia v. Lee, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 511, 520; Williams v. Suffolk Insurance Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415; U. S. v. Yorba, 1 Wall. 412, 423; U. S. v. Lynde, 11 Wall. 632, 638. It is equally well settled in England. (The Pelican, Edw. Adm. App. D; Taylor v. Bar- [137 U.S. 202, 213] clay, 2 Sim. 213; Emperor of Austria v. Day, 3 De Gex, F. &. J. 217, 221, 233; Republic of Peru v. Peruvian Guano Co., 36 Ch. Div. 489, 497; Republic of Peru v. Dreyfus, 38 Ch. Div. 348, 356, 359.) Delivering the opinion of the court, Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, stated: “The words 'people of the United States' and 'citizens' are synonymous terms, and mean the same thing. They both describe the political body who, according to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the power and conduct the Government through their representatives. They are what we familiarly call the 'sovereign people,' and every citizen is one of this people, and a constituent member of this sovereignty.” (Dred Scott v Sanford, 60 US 393; 19 How. (1856); Boyd v. State of Nebraska 143 U.S. 135 (1892)); 'The rights of sovereignty extend to all persons and things not privileged, that are within the territory. They extend to all strangers resident therein: not only to those who are naturalized, and to those who are domiciled therein, having taken up their abode with the intention of permanent residence, but also to those whose residence is transitory. All strangers are under the protection of the sovereign while they are within his territory and owe a temporary allegiance in return for that protection.' " (Carlisle v. United States, 83 U.S. 147, 154 (1873)); "The ultimate authority ... resides in the people alone." - The Federalist, No. 46, James Madison.

"[I]n our country the people are sovereign and the government cannot sever its relationship to them by taking away their citizenship." (Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 7; 8 S. Ct. 568, 2 L. Ed. 2d 603 (1958)); "... The Congress cannot revoke the Sovereign power of the people to override itself as thus declared." (Perry v. United States , 294 U.S. 330, 353 (1935)). "A public official is a fiduciary toward the public, including, in the case of a judge, the litigants who appear before him." (see United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163, 168, 7th Cir. 1985; McNally v. U.S., 483 U.S. 350, 371-372 (1987), Quoting U.S. v. Holzer, 816 F.2d. 304, 307) "[G]overnments are but trustees acting under derived authority and have no power to delegate what is not delegated to them. (Luther v. Borden, 48 US 1, 12 LEd 581 ( )); "The people in their capacity of Sovereigns made and adopted the Constitution; and it binds the state governments without the state's permission." (4 Wheat, 402);
"The power to "legislate generally upon life, liberty, and property, as opposed to the "power to provide modes of redress" against offensive state action, is "repugnant" to the Constitution."
( United States v Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 218 Id., at 15 (1876); United States v, Harpris, 106 U.S. 629,639 (1883); James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 139 (1903)).

"[T]here is no such thing as a power of inherent sovereignty in the government of the United States. It is a government of delegated powers, supreme within its prescribed sphere but powerless outside of it. In this country, sovereignty resides in the people, and Congress can exercise no power which they have not, by their Constitution, entrusted to it; all else is withheld." - Justice Field - Legal Tender Case, (Julliard vs Greenman - 110 U.S. 421 (1884)); "Government is not Sovereignty. Government is the machinery or expedient for expressing the will of the sovereign power." (City of Bisbee v. Cochise County, 78 P. 2d 982, 986, 52 Ariz. 1); "No such ideas (government as the sovereign) obtain here: at the revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people; and they are truly the sovereigns of the country, but they are sovereigns without subjects and have none to govern but themselves; the citizens of America are equal as fellow citizens, and as joint tenants in the sovereignty." (Chisholm v Georgia, 2. U.S. (Dall 2) 419, 1 L. Ed. 440 (1793)), “The words ‘sovereign state’ are cabalistic words, not understood by the disciple of liberty, who has been instructed in our constitutional schools. It is our appropriate phrase when applied to an absolute despotism. The idea of sovereign power in the government of a republic is incompatible with the existence and foundation of civil liberty and the rights of property.” (Gaines v. Buford, 31 Ky. (1 Dana) 481, 501); “The sovereignty of a state extends to everything which exists by its own authority", or is introduced by its permission.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819)); Government possesses "sovereign immunity," qaulified immunity, and judicial immunity, but in relation only to those it creates. (Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 371 (1943)).
"The theory of the American political system is that the ultimate sovereignty is in the people, from whom all legitimate authority springs, and the people collectively, acting through the medium of constitutions, create such governmental agencies, endow them with such powers, and subject them to such limitations as in their wisdom will best promote the common good." (First Trust Co. v. Smith, 134 Neb.; 277 SW 762 ()). "When this country achieved its independence the prerogatives of the crown devolved upon the people of the States. And this power still remains with them." (U. S. Supreme Court - Wheeler v. Smith, 9 How. 33); ". . . at the Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people; and they are truly the sovereigns of the country, but they are sovereigns without subjects . . . with none to govern but themselves; the citizens of America are equal as fellow citizens, and as joint tenants in the sovereignty." (Chisholm v. Georgia US 2 Dall 419, 454, 1 L Ed 440, 455 (1793)); “When the [American] Revolution took place, the people of each State became themselves sovereign.” ( Pollard v Hagan 3 H. 212( )) . "The people of this State, as the successors of its former sovereign, are entitled to all the rights which formerly belonged to the King by his prerogative. Through the medium of their Legislature they may exercise all the powers which previous to the Revolution could have been exercised either by the King alone, or by him in conjunction with his Parliament; subject only to those restrictions which have been imposed by the Constitution of this State or of the U.S." (Lansing v. Smith, 21 D. 89., 4 Wendel 9 (1829); Lansing v. Smith, 4 Wend. 9 (1829), 21 Am.Dec. 89 10C Const. Law Sec. 298; 18 C Em.Dom. Sec. 3, 228; 37 C Nav.Wat. Sec. 219; Nuls Sec. 1`67; 48 C Wharves Sec. 3, 7));
Republican Government is " in which the powers of sovereignty are vested in the people and are exercised by the people, either directly, or through representatives chosen by the people, to whom those powers are specially delegated." (In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449, 11 S.Ct. 573, 35 L.Ed. 219; Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 21 Wall. 162, 22 L.Ed. 627; Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 626); "In the United States, Sovereignty resides in the people, who act through the organs established by the Constitution." (Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall 419, 471; Penhallow v. Doane's Administrators, 3 Dall 54, 93; McCullock v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 404, 405; Yick Wo v. Hopkins ,118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)); "Strictly speaking, in our republican form of government, the absolute sovereignty of the nation is in the people of the nation: and the residuary sovereignty of each state, not granted to any of its public functionaries, is in the people of the state." (2 Dall. 471; Bouv. Law Diet. (1870)); "In this country, sovereignty resides with the people." (Julliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421 (1883). See also, Bellei v. Rusk, D.C. (1969), 296 F.Supp 1247). The "People are supreme, not the state." (Waring v. the Mayor of Savannah, 60 GA at 93).
"The question is not what power government ought to have, but what powers, in fact, have been given by the people.... [a] union is a government of delegated powers. It has only such as are expressly conferred upon it, and such as are reasonably to be implied from those granted. In this respect, we differ radically from nations where all legislative power, without restriction of limitation, is vested in a parliament or other legislative body subject to no restrictions except the discretion of its members [monopoly bar association legislative executives masquerading as judicial branch judges who refuse to acknowlege the preferred position of natural rights and their protection in the common law constitutionally for their commercial exploitation schemes]. (U.S. v. William M. Butler, 297 U.S. 1)). The people are the recognized source of all authority, state or municipal, and to this authority it must come at last, whether immediately or by circuitous route. (Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U.S. 540, 545 [23: 440, 441]. p 234()). A Sovereign Citizen, a member of the "We the People," cannot be punished for sincerely held religious or political convictions, such as the belief that he is in fact born free, not an employee, office, or property of government, being at liberty to act as such within his natural rights. (Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991).
“Whensoever the General Government assumes undelegated powers, its act are unauthorized, void, and of no force.” - Thomas Jefferson; "The people of the State do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies which serve them. The people, in delegating authority, do not give their public servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is not good for them to know. The people insist on remaining informed so that they may retain control over the instruments they have created." ( The Texas Open Meetings Act, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6252-17 (applies to legislative courts)); Added Stats. 1953, c. 1588, p.3270, sec. 1.)

somewhere above, in delagated powers, cite constitution, and state similar.

“This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the people, and all powers, not herein delegated, remain with the people.” Constitution of the State of Ohio, Art. I, Sec. 20

The presumption that controing fundamental laws may be overthrown by subsequent subordinant legislation

THAT "Due to sloth, inattention or desire to seize tactical advantage, lawyers [judges, Justices and Executive Administrators] have long engaged in dilatory practices... the glacial pace of much litigation breeds frustration with the Federal Courts and ultimately, disrespect for the law." (Roadway Express v. Pipe, 447 U.S. 752 at 757 (1982)), the general misconception among the public being that any exercise of state police, regulatory, or judicial power bearing the appearance of law and exacted upon them to their detriment is in fact in agreement with the law of the land, and is therefore legitimate in its operation as implemented or imposed.
THAT State statutes and regulatory rules for civil proceedure uniformly passed and enacted in each state of the union, such as TRCP RULE 52 in Texas, under such sub headings as ‘ALLEGING A CORPORATION,’ provide : “In any proceeding before the [state] court, it shall not be necessary to prove the incorporation of any corporation mentioned in the complaint; thus, the Corporate existence of any individual entering the court is presumed by the court unless an affidavit specifically denying the existence of such corporation is present;” However, directly contradicting this, as to concure therewith certainly would prejudice the rights, priveleges, immunities and protections of the native, indigenous, natural born sovereign state citizen, unlearned in advanced legal language and forgery, in Downes vs Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 319 (1901), the supreme court ruled that "incorporation 'IS NOT' to be assumed without express declaration, or an implication so strong as to exclude any other view." Coincidentally, Texas Administrative Code - 1 TAC § 79.31, in defining CORPORATIONS (ENTITY NAMES), states that with respect to such "(a) Entity names... (b) Only upper case or capitol letters, with no distinction as to type face or font, will be recognized." What this means is that nearly every court proceeding against a natural person is predicated upon a judges initial incorrect presumption in law, for devious and immorral purposes, that the living person called to stand in action before them is dead to natural rights, unless they demand and invoke them. Nearly every state process issued, for this reason alone, is but a form of mail fraud with intent to defraud the person recieving it.
“A state may impose an excise upon the franchise of corporations engaging in a business which every private Citizen has a right to engage in freely. The privilege taxed is the right to engage in such business with the special advantages which are incident to corporate existence." California Bank v. San Francisco, 142 Cal. 276, 75 Pac. 832, 100 A.S.R. 130, 64 L.R.A. 918. "A State may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a Right granted by the federal Constitution... Thus, it may not extract a license tax for the privilege of carrying on interstate commerce." (Murdock v Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 113 (1942); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 491 (1966)).
"The natural body or such as is formed by the laws of God, [is] as distinguished from an artificial body or such as is devised by human laws. "(1 Bl. Com. 467). " Thus, in law, a body is considered a natural person formed by the laws of God... as distinguished from an 'artificial body,' or 'corporate person,' specifying that an artificial body is devised, and regulated by human laws. And, as such, An artificial body can do only what is authorized by its charter or by law... a natural person or body, whatever is not forbidden by law." (Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 177 (1868.)) "The Natural Liberty of man is to be free from any superior power on earth, and not to be under the will or legislative authority of man, but only to have the law of nature for his rule." - Samuel Adams "You [the people] have the rights antecedent to all earthly governments; rights that cannot be repealed or restrained by human laws; right derived from the Great Legislator of the Universe." - John Adams, 2nd President of the united States of America. The natural person as defined in section 342.31 (1) of the IRS "Handbook for Special Agents" is constitutionally protected, whereas the 'creature of statute' or government created corporate body and tax payer as defined in IRS Code, is not.

11. THAT The Supreme Court has warned, "Because of what appear to be Lawful commands [Statutory obligations, Rules, Regulations, and Restrictions] on the surface, many citizens, because of their respect for what appears to be law, are cunningly coerced into waiving their rights, due to ignorance... [ exploited by the deceptive practices, barratry, legal plunder, and malicious prosecution in inferior administrative State courts]." (United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179, 187, 76 S.Ct. 281, 100 L.Ed. 185 (1956);
THAT (a) A 'Statute' is not a "Law," (Flournoy v. First Nat. Bank of Shreveport, 197 La. 1067, 3 So.2d 244, 248), (b) nor is 'Code' "Law" (In Re Self v Rhay, 61 Wn 2d 261), in point of fact in Law, (c) a concurrent or 'joint resolution' of legislature is not "Law," (Koenig v. Flynn, 258 N.Y. 292, 179 N.E. 705, 707; Ward v. State, 176 Okl. 368, 56 P.2d 136, 137; State ex rel. Todd v. Yelle, 7 Wash.2d 443, 110 P.2d 162, 165), as "All codes, rules, and regulations are for government authorities only, not human/Creators in accordance with God's laws. All codes, rules, and regulations are unconstitutional and lacking due process…" (Rodriques v. Ray Donavan, U.S. Department of Labor, 769 F. 2d 1344, 1348 (1985)); ... lacking Due process, in that they they are void for ambiguity in their failure to specify the statutes' applicability to 'natural persons,' otherwise depriving the same of fair notice, as their construction by definition of terms aptly identifies the applicability of such statutes to "artificial or fictional corperate entities or persons," creatures of statute, or those by contract employed as agents or representatives, departmental subdivisions, offices, officers, and property of government, but not the 'Natural Person,' or American citizen Immune from such jurisdiction of legalism. “The common law is the real law, the Supreme Law of the land, the code, rules, regulations, policy and statutes are “not the law.” (Self v. Rhay, 61 Wn 2d 261), they are the law of government for internal regulation, not the law of man, in his seperate but equal station and natural state, a sovereign foreign with respect to government generally.
THAT Supreme Court, in numerous instances, has reluctantly overturned the rulings of inferior State supreme courts, maintaining that "the word "person" in legal terminology is perceived as a general word which normally includes in its scope a variety of entities other than human beings." ( Church of Scientology v. U.S. Dept. of Justice 612 F. 2d 417, 425 (1979)). The "word ‘person’ as used and employed in most statutory language [and civil law] is ordinarily construed to exclude the [citizen or] sovereign, and that for one as such to be bound by statute, they must be 'specifically' named." ( Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe 442 US 653 (1979); Will v. Michigan state Police 491 U.S. 58, 105 L.Ed.2nd 45 (1989); U.S. v. General Motors Corporation, D.C. Ill, 2 F.R.D. 528, 530); "The people, or sovereign are not bound by general words in statutes, restrictive of prerogative right, title or interest, unless expressly named. Acts of limitation do not bind the King or the people. The people have been ceded all the rights of the King, the former sovereign ... It is a maxim of the common law, that when an act is made for the common good and to prevent injury, the King shall be bound, though not named, but when a statute is general and prerogative right would be divested or taken from the King [or the people] he shall not be bound." (The People v. Herkimer, 4 Cowen (NY) 345, 348 (1825); "Government admits that often the word 'person' is used in such a sense as not to include the [citizen or] sovereign but urges that... the term should be held to embrace government [and creatures of statute, representatives, employees, agents, officers, and offices, created by government and not by God]." (United States v. Cooper Corp. 318 US 600 (1941); United States v. Fox 94 US 315; United States v. Mine Workers 330 US 258 (1947); "unless the context indicates otherwise" - 1 U.S.C. Sec. 1, 2; Particularly is true where the statute imposes a burden or limitation, as distinguished from conferring a benefit or advantage." (United States v. Knight 14 pet. 301, 315 (1840); Chisolm v Georgia 2 Dall 419; Penhallen v Doane v Administration 3 Dall 54; McCullogh v Maryland 4 Wheat 316; Hauenstein v Lynharm 100 US 483 (1879); Yick Wo v Hopkins and Woo Loo v Hopkins 188 US 356 (1886)) '"...the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals' entitles each person, regardless of economic or social status, to an unequivocal warning from the legislature as to whether he is within the class of persons subject to vicarious liability. Congress cannot be deemed to have intended to punish anyone who is not 'plainly and unmistakably' within the confines of the statute." (United States v. Lacher, 134 U.S. 624, 628, 10; S.Ct. 625, 626, 33 L.Ed. 1080; United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476,485, 37 S.Ct. 407, 61 L.Ed. 857. FN1 United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95, 5 L.Ed. 37)).
THUS The term 'Person,' as employed in statutory language generally, may extend and be applied to bodies corporate and creatures of statute, those artificial or fictional entities created by government or legislation, but does Not include, extend, or apply to the natural 'person,' or citizen, while any law or presumed obligation that in any manner affects a right by converting the same into a privilege, or deprives a citizen of a right without consent, or by deception or fraud, is unconstitutional, the duty of the citizen being to ignore (16 Am Jur, 2nd) such regulation or constraint intended for creatures of statute, and corporate fictions, which are entities of form without substance, a commercial second class. THAT should any judicial officer or attorney, presumed to know the law and barred from claiming good faith ignorance of the same, knowingly and intentionally, ministerially or administratively, privately or officially, undertake placing an erroneous classification or designation upon a living man woman or child created not by government, as though he or she was not living and created by government, for the purpose of treating the same as a creature of statute, entirely circumventing the natural rights of the same, by the same act does this one abrogate and violate those same rights. He who denies all rights by implication violates all. Article I Section 1 Section 9 provides, No bill of attainder or ex post facto Law' [rules of procedure and statutory construction] shall be employed to usurp one's rights and remedies that were once allowed and for all time secured to the people. In other words, codes, rules, regulations, etc., and the lack there of, written after the constitution, only apply to government authorities, their officers and agents. No sane person, and yet only the deceived, would consent, to being treated as a corpse or slave devoid of natural liberty rights, or an unconscionable contract lacking valuable consideration, and only a criminal would treat a living person standing before them as if dead to rights in law.

All court officers have been redisgnated "revenue agents" under corperate reorganization of government proceeding the bancrupsy of 33 (citation Needed ), now compromised in the execution of their official duties by a pecuniary interest to their corperate empoyer to profit their creditors at the expence of the public, through the mandated collection of tribute and contribution, by economic exploitation and usery, through the misaplication of regulations regaurding the erronious croperate designation of natural persons as corperate person or creatures of statute, as though created by governmennt when clearly not, generating ill gotten gain which government is not lawfully entitled to by means of extortion by this swindel the common people are routinely victimezed by. The legal industrial complex, a carnavle of kangaroo courts and three ring circuses for an offering of proof offered, profits primarily on duping first class natural persons into serving as 2nd class corporate persons, entities or Persons of form without substance, dead to natural rights, dummy corperations and corpses without souls in commerce, abandoned vessels subject to statutory regulations and admiralty maritime tort siezures in rem, including fines and taxes levied through statutory obligations for abridgment of rules and regulations that only apply to artificial and fictional corperate entities created by government, creatures of statute, and certainly not natural born sovereign, indiginous native american citizens.
THAT "The misnomer of the defendant may be pleaded in abatement." (Com. Dig. Abatement, F 18 ; Lutw. 36; 1 Chit. PI. 440; Arch. Civ. PI. 312. See form of a plea in abatement for a misnomer of the defendant in 3 Saund. 209, b., and see further, 1Show. 394; Carth. 307 ; Comb. 188 ; 1 Lutw. 10 ; 5 T. R. 487), when designated or misnamed as a creature of statute pursuant to any state or federal action, yet State statutes and rules of civil procedure (which apply only to fabricated and engineered creatures of statute) make no specific provision for such relief, when natural persons are mistakenly or intentionally named as corporate fictions and creatures of statute, and despite the fact that all rights, and property in common law remedies, not explicitly granted or conferred to government are reserved to the people, the clever deprivation of these elective rights and remedies is achieved by judges erroniously claiming that these rights in action and procedure in law are somehow legislated away for the natural citizen in the states act of legislation and creation of rules for creatures of statute, which do not specifically provide for such remedies in the construction of civil or commercial rules of procedure (intended for creatures of statute only), a false argument, a logical falacy, a sophatic deception of legal reasoning, these rights and remedies in law being forever reserved to the people, to warrant the entrapment, by deception, to deprive remedy to litigants who appear before them , to circumvent the natural rights of these, under threat of default or arrest if they do not appear as a sacrifical lamb for barratry and legal plunder by means of extortion with intent to defraud, to further deprive them from accessing any remedy or means of escape or of relieving themselves of an erroneous corporate designation devoid of natural rights, protections and immunity from any and all such action.


THAT "When acting to enforce a statute, the judge of the municipal court is acting as an administrative officer and not in a judicial capacity; courts in administrating or enforcing statutes do not act judicially. But, merely administerially." (Thompson v Smith. 155 Va. 376. l54 SE 583, 7l ALR 604 ( )). “ [J]udges who become involved in enforcement of mere statutes, act as mere “clerks” of the involved agency…” (K.C. Davis., ADMIN. LAW, Ch. 1 CTP. West’s (1965)) “…their supposed “courts” becoming thus a court of “limited jurisdiction” as a mere extension of the involved agency for mere superior reviewing purposes.” (K.C. Davis, ADMIN. LAW., P. 95, CTP, 6 Ed. West’s (1977); (FRC v. G.E., 281 U.S. 464; Keller v. P.E.P., 261 U.S. 428)); whereas "Judges do not enforce statutes and codes... Executive Administrators [in their private person with no Immunity for their non judicial ministerial or administrative functions] enforce statutes and codes [erroneously, and intentionally often on private citizens for the purpose of economic exploitation through the circumvention of their natural rights, protections and Immunities]. (FRC vs. GE 281 U.S. 464; Keller vs. PE 261 U.S. 428, 1 Stat. 138-178);
"It is the accepted rule, not only in state courts, but, of the federal courts as well, that when a judge is enforcing administrative law they are described as mere 'extensions of the administrative agency for superior reviewing purposes' as a ministerial clerk for an agency..." (30 Cal 596; San Christina, etc. Co. v. San Francisco 167 Cal. 762, 141 (1914)). Review of administrative proceedings by a court does not change an administrative proceeding to a civil proceeding. (Porter v. Michigan State Bd. of State Examiners in Optometry 199 N.W.2d 666, 41 Mich. App. 150 (1972)) "It is basic in our law that an administrative agency may act only within the area of jurisdiction marked out for it by law. If an individual does not come within the coverage of the particular agency's enabling legislation the agency is without power to take any action which affects him." (Endicott v Perkins, 317 US 501 ()); "A judge ceases to set as a judicial officer because the governing principals of administrative law provides that courts are prohibited from substituting their evidence, testimony, record, arguments and rationale for that of the agency. Additionally, courts are prohibited from their substituting their judgments for that of the agency." (AISI v US, 568 F2d 284 ()). Al1 jurisdictional facts supporting claim that supposed jurisdiction exists must appear an the record of the court." (Pipe Line v Marathon. 102 S. Ct. 3858 quoting Crowell v Benson 883 US 22 ( )).
In the case of Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co. 59 U.S. 272 (1855), the Supreme Court ruled that cases involving "a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty, involving an american citizen, inherently involve judicial determination and must come before an Article III court.” Only Article III courts are invested with judicial power.“Wicked men, ambitious of power, with hatred of liberty and contempt of law, may fill the place once occupied by Washington and Lincoln... our fathers... For this, and other equally weighty reasons... secured the inheritance they had fought to maintain, by incorporating in a written constitution the safeguards which time had proved were essential to its preservation. Not one of these safeguards can the President, or Congress, or the Judiciary disturb.” (Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 125 (1866))
THAT Negative laws, such as generally found in statutory constructions, policy statutes, codes, regulations and rules as stated above, are created and written by and for the regulation of corporate persons devoid of natural rights and representatives of government for the regulation of government offices and the functions of their officers who administratively and ministerially commonly miss apply this same designation, classification and related rules and regulations intended for 'corporate persons' upon 'natural persons,' erroniously, knowingly and intentionally with the intent to circumvent, abrogate and deprive those same natural persons of natural rights, for the purposes of criminal economic exploitation and profit.
Not only do Judges, or executive administrators, bound to know the law, in their private capacity, acting as executive administrators of state sanctioned economic exploitation, knowingly, intentionally and wilfully evidence a pattern of action consistant with a conspiracy to deprive natural born native american citizens of constitutionaly protected natural liberty rights by the intentional incorrect and erronious imposition of a corperate status designation upon natural persons, but the State legislature colludes in this activity, deceptive practices, legal plunder and barretry imposed in commerce upon those entitled to honest services, such crimes being predicated upon mail and wire fraud and abuse of office to generate revenue in the intentional misapplication of designations, classifications, and applications, attatching taxes, obligations, fines and liens, and concealment of material fact and full disclosure

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