Monday, September 30, 2013

Treatise And Memorandum Of Law

11. THAT The Supreme Court has warned, "Because of what appear to be Lawful commands [Statutory Rules, Regulations and Restrictions] on the surface, many citizens, because of their respect for what appears to be law, are cunningly coerced into waiving their rights, due to ignorance... [deceptive practices, constructive fraud, barratry, legal plunder, conversion, and malicious prosecution in inferior administrative State courts]." (United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179, 187, 76 S.Ct. 281, 100 L.Ed. 185 (1956);
WHEREAS A 'Statute' is not a "Law," (Flournoy v. First Nat. Bank of Shreveport, 197 La. 1067, 3 So.2d 244, 248), nor is 'Code' "Law" (In Re Self v Rhay, 61 Wn 2d 261), in point of fact in Law, a concurrent or 'joint resolution' of legislature is not "Law," (Koenig v. Flynn, 258 N.Y. 292, 179 N.E. 705, 707; Ward v. State, 176 Okl. 368, 56 P.2d 136, 137; State ex rel. Todd v. Yelle, 7 Wash.2d 443, 110 P.2d 162, 165), as "All codes, rules, and regulations are for government authorities only, not human/Creators in accordance with God's laws. All codes, rules, and regulations are unconstitutional and lacking due process…" (Rodriques v. Ray Donavan, U.S. Department of Labor, 769 F. 2d 1344, 1348 (1985)); lacking Due process in that they they are void for ambiguity in their failure to specify their applicability to 'natural persons,' depriving the same of fair notice, identifying only corporate persons rather, officers, agents, representatives, subdivisions, and property of government. “The common law is the real law, the Supreme Law of the land, the code, rules, regulations, policy and statutes are “not the law.” (Self v. Rhay, 61 Wn 2d 261)
THAT Supreme Court, in numerous instances, has reluctantly overturned the rulings of inferior State supreme courts, maintaining that "the word "person" in legal terminology is perceived as a general word which normally includes in its scope a variety of entities other than human beings." ( Church of Scientology v. U.S. Dept. of Justice 612 F. 2d 417, 425 (1979)). The "word ‘person’ as used and employed in most statutory language [and civil law] is ordinarily construed to exclude the [citizen or] sovereign, and that for one as such to be bound by statute, they must be 'specifically' named." ( Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe 442 US 653 (1979); Will v. Michigan state Police 491 U.S. 58, 105 L.Ed.2nd 45 (1989); U.S. v. General Motors Corporation, D.C. Ill, 2 F.R.D. 528, 530); "The people, or sovereign are not bound by general words in statutes, restrictive of prerogative right, title or interest, unless expressly named. Acts of limitation do not bind the King or the people. The people have been ceded all the rights of the King, the former sovereign ... It is a maxim of the common law, that when an act is made for the common good and to prevent injury, the King shall be bound, though not named, but when a statute is general and prerogative right would be divested or taken from the King [or the people] he shall not be bound." (The People v. Herkimer, 4 Cowen (NY) 345, 348 (1825); "Government admits that often the word 'person' is used in such a sense as not to include the [citizen or] sovereign but urges that... the term should be held to embrace government [and creatures of statute, representatives, employees, agents, officers, and offices, created by government and not by God]." (United States v. Cooper Corp. 318 US 600 (1941); United States v. Fox 94 US 315; United States v. Mine Workers 330 US 258 (1947); "unless the context indicates otherwise" - 1 U.S.C. Sec. 1, 2; Particularly is true where the statute imposes a burden or limitation, as distinguished from conferring a benefit or advantage." (United States v. Knight 14 pet. 301, 315 (1840); Chisolm v Georgia 2 Dall 419; Penhallen v Doane v Administration 3 Dall 54; McCullogh v Maryland 4 Wheat 316; Hauenstein v Lynharm 100 US 483 (1879); Yick Wo v Hopkins and Woo Loo v Hopkins 188 US 356 (1886)) '"...the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals' entitles each person, regardless of economic or social status, to an unequivocal warning from the legislature as to whether he is within the class of persons subject to vicarious liability. Congress cannot be deemed to have intended to punish anyone who is not 'plainly and unmistakably' within the confines of the statute." (United States v. Lacher, 134 U.S. 624, 628, 10; S.Ct. 625, 626, 33 L.Ed. 1080; United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476,485, 37 S.Ct. 407, 61 L.Ed. 857. FN1 United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95, 5 L.Ed. 37)).
THUS The term 'Person,' as employed in statutory language generally, may extend and be applied to bodies corporate and creatures of statute, those artificial entities created by government, but does Not include, extend, or apply to the natural 'person,' or citizen, while any law or presumed obligation that in any manner affects a right by converting the same into a privilege, or deprives a citizen of a right without consent, or by deception, is unconstitutional, the duty of the citizen being to ignore (16 Am Jur, 2nd) such regulation or constraint intended for creatures of statute, and corporate fictions, which are entities of form without substance, a commercial second class. THAT should any judicial officer or attorney, presumed to know the law and barred from claiming good faith ignorance of the same, knowingly and intentionally, ministerially or administratively, privately or officially, undertake placing an erroneous classification or designation upon a living man woman or child created not by government, as though he or she was not living and created by government, a creature of statute, entirely circumventing the natural rights of the same, by the same act does this one abrogate and violate those same rights. He who denies all rights by implication violates all. Article I Section 1 Section 9 provides, No bill of attainder or ex post facto Law' [rules of procedure and statutory construction] shall be employed to usurp one's rights and remedies that were once allowed and for all time secured to the people. In other words, codes, rules, regulations, etc., and the lack there of, written after the constitution, only apply to government authorities, their officers and agents. No sane person, and yet only the deceived, would consent, to being treated as a corpse or slave devoid of natural liberty rights, or an unconscionable contract lacking valuable consideration, and only a criminal would treat a living person standing before them as if dead to rights in law.
THAT "The misnomer of the defendant may be pleaded in abatement." (Com. Dig. Abatement, F 18 ; Lutw. 36; 1 Chit. PI. 440; Arch. Civ. PI. 312. See form of a plea in abatement for a misnomer of the defendant in 3 Saund. 209, b., and see further, 1Show. 394; Carth. 307 ; Comb. 188 ; 1 Lutw. 10 ; 5 T. R. 487), when designated or misnamed as a creature of statute pursuant to any state or federal action, yet State statutes and rules of civil procedure (which apply only to fabricated and engineered creatures of statute) make no specific provision for such relief when natural persons are mistakenly or intentionally named as corporate fictions and creatures of statute, and despite the fact that all rights, and property in common law remedies, not explicitly granted or conferred to government are reserved to the people, the clever deprivation of these and remedy is achieved by judges claiming that these rights in action and procedure in law are somehow legislated away for the natural citizen in the states act of legislation and creation of rules for creatures of statute, which do not specifically provide for such remedies in the construction of civil or commercial rules of procedure (intended for creatures of statute only), a false argument, these being forever reserved to the people, a logical falacy, a sophatic deception of legal reasoning, to warrant the entrapment, by deception, to deprive remedy to litigants who appear before them , to circumvent the natural rights of these, under threat of default or arrest if they do not appear as a sacrifical lamb for barratry and legal plunder by means of extortion with intent to defraud, to further deprive them from accessing any remedy or means of escape or of relieving themselves of an erroneous corporate designation devoid of natural rights, protections and immunity from any and all such action.


THAT "When acting to enforce a statute, the judge of the municipal court is acting as an administrative officer and not in a judicial capacity; courts in administrating or enforcing statutes do not act judicially. But, merely administerially." (Thompson v Smith. 155 Va. 376. l54 SE 583, 7l ALR 604 ( )). “ [J]udges who become involved in enforcement of mere statutes, act as mere “clerks” of the involved agency…” (K.C. Davis., ADMIN. LAW, Ch. 1 CTP. West’s (1965)) “…their supposed “courts” becoming thus a court of “limited jurisdiction” as a mere extension of the involved agency for mere superior reviewing purposes.” (K.C. Davis, ADMIN. LAW., P. 95, CTP, 6 Ed. West’s (1977); (FRC v. G.E., 281 U.S. 464; Keller v. P.E.P., 261 U.S. 428)); whereas "Judges do not enforce statutes and codes... Executive Administrators [in their private person with no Immunity for their non judicial ministerial or administrative functions] enforce statutes and codes [erroneously, and intentionally often on private citizens for the purpose of economic exploitation through the circumvention of their natural rights, protections and Immunities]. (FRC vs. GE 281 U.S. 464; Keller vs. PE 261 U.S. 428, 1 Stat. 138-178);
"It is the accepted rule, not only in state courts, but, of the federal courts as well, that when a judge is enforcing administrative law they are described as mere 'extensions of the administrative agency for superior reviewing purposes' as a ministerial clerk for an agency..." (30 Cal 596; San Christina, etc. Co. v. San Francisco 167 Cal. 762, 141 (1914)). Review of administrative proceedings by a court does not change an administrative proceeding to a civil proceeding. (Porter v. Michigan State Bd. of State Examiners in Optometry 199 N.W.2d 666, 41 Mich. App. 150 (1972)) "A judge ceases to set as a judicial officer because the governing principals of administrative law provides that courts are prohibited from substituting their evidence, testimony, record, arguments and rationale for that of the agency. Additionally, courts are prohibited from their substituting their judgments for that of the agency." (AISI v US, 568 F2d 284 ()). "It is basic in our law that an administrative agency may act only within the area of jurisdiction marked out for it by law. If an individual does not come within the coverage of the particular agency's enabling legislation the agency is without power to take any action which affects him." (Endicott v Perkins, 317 US 501 ()); Al1 jurisdictional facts supporting claim that supposed jurisdiction exists must appear an the record of the court." (Pipe Line v Marathon. 102 S. Ct. 3858 quoting Crowell v Benson 883 US 22 ( )).
In the case of Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co. 59 U.S. 272 (1855), the Supreme Court ruled that cases involving "a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty inherently involve judicial determination and must come before an Article III court.” Only Article III courts are invested with judicial power.“Wicked men, ambitious of power, with hatred of liberty and contempt of law, may fill the place once occupied by Washington and Lincoln... our fathers... For this, and other equally weighty reasons... secured the inheritance they had fought to maintain, by incorporating in a written constitution the safeguards which time had proved were essential to its preservation. Not one of these safeguards can the President, or Congress, or the Judiciary disturb.” (Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 125 (1866))
THAT Negative laws, such as generally found in statutory constructions, policy statutes, codes, regulations and rules as stated above, are created and written by and for the regulation of corporate persons devoid of natural rights and representatives of government for the regulation of government offices and the functions of their officers who administratively and ministerially commonly miss apply this same designation, classification and related rules and regulations intended for 'corporate persons' upon 'natural persons,' erroniously, knowingly and intentionally with the intent to circumvent, abrogate and deprive those same natural persons of natural rights, for the purposes of criminal economic exploitation and profit.

Not only do Judges, or executive administrators, bound to know the law, in their private capacity, knowingly, intentionally and wilfully evidence a pattern of action consistant with a conspiracy to deprive natural born native american citizens of constitutionaly protected natural liberty rights by the intentional incorrect and erronious imposition of a corperate status designation upon natural persons, but the State legislature colludes in this activity, such crimes being predicated upon mail and wire fraud and abuse of office in the intentional misapplication of designations, classifications, and applications, attatching taxes, obligations, fines and liens, with menace to forethought in the regulation of natural persons and sovereign citizens as corperate citizens and creatures of statute devoid of natural rights, for the purpose of state sanctioned economic exploitation, profit and the aquisition of ill gotten gain through deceptive practices, legal plunder and barretry imposed in commerce upon those entitled to honest services and full disclosure of all terms and conditions regarding contracts and the nature and cause regarding civil and criminal charges or indictments, that when they respond to most common complaints, suites and summons, they are presumed by the state and judicial officer to be dead to natural rights in commerce.
The Judiciary; is "an irresponsible body (for impeachment is scarcely a scare-crow) working like gravity by night and by day, gaining a little today and a little tomorrow, and advancing its noiseless step like a thief, over the field of jurisdiction, until all shall be usurped.” (Thomas Jefferson - Letter to Charles Hammond, August 18, 1821; ME 15:331 ); “The great object of my fear is the... Judiciary. That body, like gravity, ever acting with noiseless foot and unalarming advance, gaining ground step by step and holding what it gains, is engulfing insidiously the special governments into the jaws of that which feeds them.” (Letter to Judge Spencer Roane, 1821 ME 15:326) "The judiciary is the subtle corps of sappers and miners constantly working under ground to undermine the foundations of our confederated fabric. They are construing our Constitution from a co-ordination of a general and special government to a general and supreme one alone. This will lay all things at their feet, and they are too well versed in English law to forget the maxim, 'boni judicis est ampliare jurisdictionem.'" (Letter to Thomas Ritchie, 1820. ME 15:297) “At the establishment of our constitutions, the judiciary bodies were supposed to be the most helpless and harmless members of the government. Experience, however, soon showed in what way they were to become the most dangerous; that the insufficiency of the means provided for their removal gave them a freehold and irresponsibility in office; that their decisions, seeming to concern individual suitors only, pass silent and unheeded by the public at large; that these decisions, nevertheless, become law by precedent, sapping, by little and little, the foundations of the constitution, and working its change by construction, before any one has perceived that that invisible and helpless worm has been busily employed in consuming its substance. In truth, man is not made to be trusted for life if secured against all liability to account.” (Letter to A. Coray, October 31, 1823)

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